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Revolving	  door	  legisla.on:	  	  
An	  interna.onal	  comparison	  
Jim	  Porter,	  Utah	  State	  University	  	  	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Josh	  Smith,	  Utah	  State	  University	  	  	  	  |	  	  	  Seth	  Muhlestein	  Utah	  State	  University	  
Study	  conducted	  with	  funding	  from	  
Randy	  Simmons	  
Utah	  State	  University	  
Economics	  and	  Finance	  
randy.simmons@usu.edu	  
I.  Introduc.on	  	  
The	  study	  collected	  members	  of	  	  
the	  United	  States	  Congress	  from	  
both	  the	  House	  of	  
Representa.ves	  	  and	  the	  Senate.	  
A	  second	  sample	  was	  taken	  from	  
and	  the	  Bri.sh	  House	  of	  
Commons.	  Individuals	  were	  
selected	  who	  had	  leL	  their	  
elected	  office	  for	  any	  reason.	  	  
	  
Taken	  from	  these	  lists,	  200	  
poli.cians	  were	  randomly	  
selected	  to	  comprise	  the	  sample.	  
Half,	  100	  poli.cians,	  came	  from	  
the	  United	  States	  Congress	  with	  
the	  remaining	  100	  poli.cians	  from	  
the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  study,	  an	  individual	  was	  
considered	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  
revolving	  door	  if	  they	  had	  worked	  
on	  a	  commiRee	  that	  dealt	  with	  an	  
area	  of	  business	  the	  poli.cian	  was	  
became	  involved	  with	  aLer	  
leaving	  public	  office.	  This	  number	  
included	  lobbyists	  in	  addi.on	  to	  
legislators,	  if	  they	  entered	  the	  








From	  the	  sample	  of	  U.S	  
Congressman,	  45%	  of	  combined	  
Senators	  and	  Representa.ves	  
began	  working	  in	  the	  private	  
sector	  in	  a	  posi.on	  that	  benefits	  





From	  the	  sample	  of	  UK	  Ministers,	  
9%	  began	  or	  con.nued	  working	  in	  
the	  private	  sector	  in	  a	  posi.on	  
that	  benefits	  from	  their	  
congressional	  experience	  aLer	  





















•  The	  difference	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
revolving	  door	  scores	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  a	  combina.on	  of	  their	  
different	  governing	  systems	  and	  different	  rules	  concerning	  the	  
revolving	  door.	  	  
•  The	  data	  reflects	  that	  the	  United	  States	  guidelines	  are	  not	  as	  good	  
at	  preven.ng	  the	  revolving	  door	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  laws.	  	  	  
•  There	  is	  cause	  for	  cau.on	  against	  absolute	  prohibi.ons	  because	  
specialized	  legislators	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  effec.ve	  regulators.	  
•  Those	  growing	  up	  on	  a	  farm	  and	  without	  any	  finance	  experience	  
are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effec.ve	  regulators	  of	  the	  financial	  industry.	  
•  Those	  who	  grew	  up	  on	  a	  farm	  and	  own	  and	  operate	  their	  own	  are	  
likely	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  command	  of	  the	  regulatory	  challenges	  
facing	  the	  agricultural	  industry.	  They	  are,	  however,	  also	  more	  
likely	  to	  have	  conflic.ng	  interests	  that	  interfere	  with	  their	  ability	  
to	  serve	  the	  common	  good.	  
•  Governments	  must	  find	  a	  balance	  between	  specializa.on	  and	  the	  
possibility	  of	  abuse	  and	  regulatory	  capture.	  
IV.	  Conclusions	  
Ryan	  Yonk	  
Utah	  State	  University	  
Economics	  and	  Finance	  
ryan@strata.org	  
The	  revolving	  door	  refers	  to	  
the	  movement	  of	  personnel	  
between	  government	  and	  
business.	  This	  .ghtening	  of	  
links	  between	  government	  and	  	  
business	  could	  subvert	  the	  
purpose	  of	  government	  such	  
that	  private	  interests	  are	  
served	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
general	  welfare.	  	  
	  
The	  tendency	  for	  public	  
officials	  to	  jump	  back	  and	  forth	  
between	  Congress	  and	  the	  
private	  sector	  may	  not	  be	  the	  
same	  for	  every	  country.	  
	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  will	  
be	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  
different	  forms	  of	  government	  
and	  regula.ons	  on	  the	  




















Legisla.on	  in	  the	  US	  focuses	  on	  a	  
“cooling	  off	  period”	  before	  former	  
members	  may	  lobby.	  House	  
members	  are	  prohibited	  from	  
“making	  representa.ons”	  one	  
year	  aLer	  the	  member	  leaves	  
office.	  	  
	  
Senators	  are	  similarly	  prohibited	  
from	  such	  lobbying	  for	  two	  years.	  	  
	  
(See	  18	  U.S.C.	  §	  207(e)(1)(B),	  as	  	  
amended	  by	  P.L.	  110-­‐81,	  Sec.on	  101	  
and	  18	  U.S.C.	  §	  207(e)(1)(A),	  as	  
amended	  by	  P.L.	  110-­‐81,	  Sec.on	  101)	  
UK	  House	  of	  Commons:	  
	  
Ministers	  have	  no	  formal	  
restric.ons	  on	  their	  future	  
employment.	  	  
There	  is	  an	  Advisory	  CommiRee	  
on	  Business	  
Appointments(ACOBA)	  which	  
Ministers	  are	  expected	  to	  consult	  
and	  abide	  by	  their	  advice.	  
Transparency	  Interna.onal	  
reports	  that	  ministers	  are	  mostly	  
obedient	  to	  those	  guidelines.	  
However,	  the	  ACOBA	  has	  no	  
monitoring	  or	  enforcing	  power.	  
(See	  Cabs	  For	  Hire?.	  Transparency	  
Interna.onal	  UK.	  2011)	  
Legisla.on	  
